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which he has been required to pay in taxes. Finally, where there is a power to
consume only for purposes of maintenance and support, the life tenant should
pay the tax in a fiduciary capacity. When the individual is in a position where
he must rely on consumption of corpus for his maintenance and support,
taxing him as owner of capital gains would tend to increase his needs. In
order to satisfy them he would be forced to consume corpus assets in such
amount as to offset the cost incurred by the tax assessment. This method could
produce additional hardships resulting from delays between time of payment
of the tax and acquisition of liquidated corpus assets. Where the life tenant
does not rely on corpus for maintenance and support, taxing him as owner
would be unjust, since his position would not enable him to acquire, abso-
lutely, the gain for which he would be taxed.
ASSERTION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
TO PROTECT THE CLIENT'S IDENTITY
The attorney-client privilege, which prevents disclosure of statements made
confidentially to an attorney,' has been limited by the rule that the client's
identity falls outside the scope of the privilege. 2 This judicially imposed limi-
tation has recently been subjected to close scrutiny. In three recent cases the
privilege has been invoked to protect the identity of clients.3 These cases
reflect an emphasis on the underlying purpose of the attoney-client privilege
and a tendency to reject the rule, that the client's identity is not privileged,
when it conflicts with that purpose. It is the effect of these cases on the
general rule which constitutes the principal topic of this note.
The attorney-client privilege, stated generally, provides that confidential
statements, communicated in the course of a professonal relationship between
an attorney and his client, may not be divulged by the attorney without the
client's consent. 4 The attorney-client privilege formerly was considered a
matter of the attorney's honor; but it is now considered to be the privilege
of the client.5 Modern justifications for the attorney-client privilege are based
on social policy. The most frequently stated justification is that the privilege
1 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (3d ed. 1940).
2 E.g., United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1944); Goddard v. United States
131 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1942); People ex reL Vogelstein v. Warden, 150 Misc. 714, 270
N.Y. Supp. 362 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd mem., 242 App. Div. 611, 271 N.Y. Supp. 1059
(1934); Annot., 114 A.L.R. 1321 (1938).
3 Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960), 13 ALA. L. REV. 196 (1960), 47 VA.
L. REV. 126 (1961). Exparte Enzor, 270 Ala. 254, 117 So. 2d 361 (1960); In re Kaplan
8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d 660, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1960).
4 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 276 (1957). For a more detailed statement of the general rule
see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (3d ed. 1940). The attorney-client privilege has been codi-
fied in many jurisdictions in essentially its common law form. Id. at 558.
5 8 WIGMOmR, EVIDENCE § 2290 (3d. ed. 1940).
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promotes freedom of consultation by removing the client's apprehension that
confidential disclosures can be elicited from his attorney.6 An additional and
more cynical rationale is that without the privilege a disreputable lawyer
would have an advantage; he would be the only one to whom clients would
confidently make full disclosure since, for a large enough retainer, he would
assure his client that he would not testify concerning any communications
made to him. Another factor may be the general unwillingness of the law to
allow a lawyer to be a witness. No matter what rationale has been offered,
the attorney-client privilege has been, almost from its inception, regarded
by both courts7 and commentators 8 with skepticism. The harm done by the
attorney-client privilege in the suppression of truth in litigation or official
investigations is apparent to the courts, and they have accordingly tended
to construe the privilege strictly.9 It is not surprising, therefore, that courts
have created various limitations at the periphery of the privilege.
I
One limitation is the rule that "the client's identity does not come within
the scope of the privilege."'10 The courts have generally declared that the sub-
ject matter of the employment, not the fact of the employment, is within
the privilege." The courts have not, however, always applied their formal dec-
larations, and in many instances they have protected the client's identity.
Several situations can be presented where revealing the client's identity
6 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (3d. ed. 1940). See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 210,
comment (1942).
7 E.g., Alden v. Goddard, 73 Me. 345, 348 (1882). "'I think this confidence in the case
of attorneys is a great anomaly in the law.' It requires limitation rather than extension."
8 E.g., Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE at 27 (1942).
9 See, e.g., Satterlee v. Bliss, 36 Cal. 489 (1869). More modern cases also tend towards
strictly construing the communications that are to be privileged. Prichard v. United States,
181 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1950), aff'dper curiam 339 U.S. 974 (1950); United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). For a summary of recent developments
in the field of privileged communications, see Note, 5 VAND. L. Rav. 590 (1952).
10 People ex rel Vogelstein v. Warden, 150 Misc. 714, 719, 270 N.Y. Supp. 362, 369
(Sup. Ct. 1934). Most of the earlier cases also use similar broad phrasing of the general
rule. See, e.g., Mobile & Montgomery Ry. v. Yeates, 67 Ala. 164 (1880); Satterlee v. Bliss,
36 Cal. 489 (1869); Martin v. Anderson, 21 Ga. 301 (1857). More modern authorities,
in most instances, do not state the rule with as much generality. E.g., 58 AM. JUg. Witnesses
§ 507 (1948), where it is stated that the attorney-client privilege "does not ordinarily apply
to... the ... name of the person employing" the attorney.
11 E.g., United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1944); Goddard v. United States,
131 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1942); Gretsky v. Miller, 160 F. Supp. 914 (D. Mass. 1958). The
court in the Gretsky case stated that "it is elementary that the privilege attaches not to the
relationship but only to certain communications made by the client to the attorney.... The
fact of representation is not within the privilege.... Indeed it is a necessary preliminary
act, to be established before any privilege can be asserted." Id. at 915. The assumption
necessary for this argument, that the identity of the client is never a confidential communi-
cation, is factually incorrect.
would reveal so much of the confidential relationship between an attorney
and his client that a literal application of the general rule would reach
an unsound result: (1) A client employs an attorney to pass information to
an investigating committee without revealing his name, because he fears
outside reprisals.12 (2) An attorney posts bond on behalf of his client for a
third person. (3) An attorney attending an inquest into a hit and run automo-
bile accident is required to take the stand and reveal on whose behalf he is
attending the inquest. 13 The general rule excluding the client's identity from
the privilege cannot adequately deal with such situations; they must be
considered on their separate facts. 14
When the cases in which the general rule has been applied are analyzed,
the broad scope of the rule' 5 may be understood. The vast majority of the
cases where the general rule has been applied fall into three categories:
(1) decisions based upon the rule, applicable in all the attorney-client privilege
cases, that a communication to an attorney in furtherance of a future crime
is not privileged;16 (2) decisions based upon the general proposition that the
parties to litigation are entitled to know who their opponents are; 17 and
(3) decisions where the confidence necessary for sustaining the privilege was
not present.18
Where the identity of the client is communicated in furtherance of a future
crime or anti-social conduct, the courts have had little trouble in denying the
12 See In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d 660, 203 N.Y.S. 2d 836 (1960).
13 United States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 56 Ont. L.R. 635, 643, 2 D.L.R. 966, 976 (1925)
(dicta).
14 See 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2313 (3d ed. 1940), where Professor Wigmore, in regard
to cases concerning the client's identity, states that "no doubt much ought to depend
upon the circumstances of each case."
is In Mauch v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1940), the court, in referring to the
authorities which exclude bare identity from the privilege states that: "Their reasoning
is rather too general and not impressive, based as it is on some idea that the privilege does
not attach to the creation of the relation .... Id. at 556. See Judge Barnes' breakdown of
the majority cases in the Baird opinion. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 632 (9th Cir. 1960).
16 Where the party is being tried for a crime in furtherance of which the communication
to the attorney was made and evidence has been introduced giving "color" to the charge,
it is well settled that the communication is no longer privileged. E.g., Pollock v. United
States, 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1953); In re Selser, 15 N.J. 393, 105 A.2d 395 (1954), 33 CH.
KENT L. REv. 271 (1955); 24 FORDHAM L. REv. 290 (1955); 29 TUL. L. REv. 785 (1957).
In re Stein, I N.J. 228, 62 A.2d 801 (1949); Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N.J. Eq. 455, 21 AtI.
1054 (1891); Williams v. Williams, 108 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); 58 AM. Jug.
Witnesses § 516 (1948); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2298 (3d ed. 1940).
17 See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2313 (3d ed. 1940).
18 See, e.g., Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 943 (1956). On cross examination the defendant was compelled to disclose certain
questions he had requested his attorney to ask a government witness at a preliminary
hearing. United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Spencer v. Bums,
413 IM. 240, 108 N.E.2d 413 (1952); Baum v. Denn, 187 Ore. 401, 211 P.2d 478 (1949).
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claim of privilege to protect the client's identity'9 since the entire interview
would be considered outside the privilege. 20 Application of the attorney-client
privilege to prevent the revelation of a communication in furtherance of a
crime would place the courts in the ludicrous position of holding out their
officers as silent accomplices to crime. The problem in cases of this type is to
distinguish between communications made to an attorney as to past transac-
tions, and those made in regard to future transactions since communications
concerning past fraudulent transactions are normally privileged. 21
The second category of cases requiring disclosure is based upon the often-
stated principle that "every litigant is in justice entitled to know the name of
his opponents. He cannot be obliged to struggle in the dark against unknown
forces." 22 This principle was the original justification for the rule excluding
the client's identity from the attorney-client privilege. The rule, therefore,
is rooted in civil litigation-particularly in ejectment suits2 3 where the parties
to the litigation might be ignorant of the identity of their opponents. In
civil litigation generally, where the client is either the plaintiff24 or the de-
fendant,25 the principle of identifying parties to litigation should be applica-
ble. It is certainly within the court's power to require the parties directly
involved in its proceedings to be identified. The fundamental premise of our
adversary procedure is that the parties to litigation are vitally interested therein
and that the judgment can affect their interest. If attorneys were allowed
to appear in court and represent unidentified litigants, there would not be
the necessary clash of adverse interests. Judicial machinery may be abused
by parties to litigation remaining unidentified. The courts on their own voli-
tion, to prevent this abuse, may require an attorney to reveal the name of the
19 See Application of Franklin Washington Trust Co., 1 Misc. 2d 1001, 148 N.Y.S.2d
731 (Sup. Ct. 1956). In this case a building was conveyed to the attorney's clerk to avoid
confiscation in satisfaction of a judgment. The attorney would not reveal who the client
was on the basis of the attorney-client privilege, but the court held that the communication
was not within the attorney-client privilege, since the attorney's services had been used to
perpetrate a fraud. Cf., In re Sawyer's Petition, 229 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1956) (dictum),
45 CALIF. L. REv. 75 (1957); In re Selser, 15 N.J. 393, 105 A.2d 395 (1954).
20 See generally Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1953); Williams v.
Williams, 108 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
21 Williams v. Williams, supra note 20.
22 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2313, at 608 (3d ed. 1940).
23 Stephens v. Mattox, 37 Ga. 289 (1867); Martin v. Anderson, 21 Ga. 301 (1857).
(An attorney in an ejectment action was compelled to testify whether a certain party had
given him instructions to sue.)
24 Brown v. Payson, 6 N.H. 443 (1833).
25 See Dunipace v. Martin, 73 Ariz. 415, 242 P.2d 543 (1952). The plaintiff had reason
to believe that the attorneys opposing him represented an insurance company in addition
to the one he had sued. The court declared that he could properly ask the name of the
unknown insurance company, but held that under the particular circumstances of the case
there was no reversible error.
person who has authorized him to appear. 26 Basing the decisions which
require attorneys in civil litigation to disclose the identity of their clients
on the general rule that the identity of the client is not privileged is both
misleading and unnecessary; notwithstanding the attorney-client privilege,
the efficient administration of justice requires that parties to civil litigation
be identified.
The requirement that parties to litigation be identified, although formerly
applied only in civil litigation, has been extended to cover criminal proceed-
ings. The most far-reaching decision is United States v. Pape.27 Pape was ac-
cused of violating the White Slave Traffic Act,28 and the district court required
Pape's attorney to reveal that he had defended the allegedly transported
woman in an earlier prostitution charge. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit disregarded the incriminating nature of this testimony, and
held that under the circumstances of the case the identity of the client was
not privileged. Judge Learned Hand, although agreeing that the defendant's
hiring the attorney for himself was not a privileged communication, dissented
on the ground that the defendant's instruction to his attorney to appear
for the woman "was a communication between an attorney and client, a
step in his own defense ... [and] that direction to his own attorney... was
as much a privileged communication as any direction would have been." 29
It is difficult to see how hiring an attorney to defend someone else can adverse-
ly affect the administration of justice, yet it seems probable that the Pape
decision may have the effect of discouraging this practice. The evidence
offered in Pape was an important step in connecting the defendant with the
woman's prostitution, and it is just this type of incriminating evidence which
attorneys are not normally forced to disclose. Whether the interests of the
government in prosecuting an alleged violator of the White Slave Traffic
Act were sufficient to require the defendant's attorney to disclose this evidence
remains a troublesome question.
The court in Pape relied on United States v. Lee30 and Vogelstein v. War-
den3l to support its conclusion. In Lee the defendant had fled from justice,
26 See Alger v. Turner, 105 Ga. 178, 31 S.E. 423 (1898); Ninety-nine Plaintiffs v. Vander-
bilt, 1 Abb. Pr. 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855). KAN. REV. STAT. § 7-107 (1949), provides that the
court may require the attorney to prove "the authority under which he appears." For an
application of the statute, see Klingberg v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 137 Kan. 523, 21 P.2d
405 (1933).
27 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1944). 29 144 F.2d. at 783.
28 18 U.S.C. § 398 (1958). 30 107 Fed. 702 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1901).
31150 Misc. 714, 270 N.Y.Supp. 362 (Sup. Ct. 1934). Contra, Ex parte McDonough,
170 Cal. 230, 149 Pac. 566 (1915). The Vogelstein case was recently followed in In re
Richardson, 31 N.J. 391, 157 A.2d 695 (1960). (Purpose of the questioning was to acquire
evidence against a present defendant by requiring an attorney to reveal the identity of a
third party client). But see, Exparte Schneider, 294 S.W. 736 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
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and the attorney who had previously represented the defendant was called
before a grand jury investigating the disappearance and required to reveal
the name of the party who had retained him to defend the fugitive. The court
acknowledged that the attorney-general's purpose was to obtain the client's
name in order to show the client's possible complicity in the disappearance;
nevertheless, it declared that "the court has a right to know that the client
whose secret is treasured is actual flesh and blood, and demand his identi-
fication ... "32
In Vogelstein a grand jury was conducting an inquiry into the policy
game. An attorney who was called as a witness was required to disclose the
name of a client who had previously hired him to represent certain defendants
in a policy-game prosecution. The New York Court of Appeals followed the
Lee case, which it considered directly in point, and held that the identity of the
client was not privileged.
In both Lee and Vogelstein the prejudice to the individual client's interest
caused by compelled disclosure of his identity was not sufficient to weight
the balance in favor of privileging his identity. An important factor weighing
against the privilege is the widespread possibility for sharp practices which
would attend the privilege to cloak a client's identity in secrecy. Justice
Shientag, defending the court's conclusion in Vogelstein, stated that "the con-
clusion reached would seem to be inevitable, if we are to maintain the honor
of the profession, and make an officer of the court an agency to advance the
ends of justice, rather than to be used as an instrument to subvert them."33
An additional factor in these cases may be the general tendency of the courts
to limit the application of customary exclusionary rules of evidence in grand
jury proceedings. 34 In order to facilitate the investigatory powers of the grand
jury the fullest possible disclosure may be necessary. Nevertheless, it may be
socially undesirable for grand juries in the guise of obtaining a client's identity
to obtain incriminating evidence concerning the client from his attorney.
The Lee and Vogelstein cases also help determine how far back in the crimi-
nal process the principle of identifying parties to litigation can be extended.
These cases at the very least have included grand jury proceedings within
the scope of "litigation." The extent to which the principle may be extended
is as yet unsettled.
The third category of decisions requiring disclosure includes those cases
where the court has determined that the identity of the client was not a con-
fidential communication within the technical meaning of that term.35 Because
32 107 Fed. at 704.
33 150 Misc. 714, 721, 270 N.Y.Supp. 362, 371.
34 See generally, Comment, Rules of Evidence in Disbarment, Habeas Corpus, and
Grand Jury Proceedings, 58 MicH. L. Rav. 1218 (1960).
35 Where a third person is present the communication is generally not considered
confidential. In re Quick's Estate, 161 Wash. 537, 297 Pac. 198 (1931). Nor is the communi-
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the courts have used this category as a "catch all," three distinct factual
variations are contained within it: (1) cases where the attorney is the defend-
ant; 36 (2) cases where a past client is the present defendant and the attorney
seeks to conceal his earlier representation;37 and (3) cases where the client
has denied the fact of representation. 38
Mauch v. Commissioner39 vividly illustrates the factors at work in the first
situation. In Mauch the attorney was the defendant in an income tax fraud
trial. He asserted that certain funds which he had not declared as income were
not his funds, but the funds of certain clients whom he refused to identify.
The court had little trouble in deciding that the names of the clients had to
be revealed. It is now well established that the attorney-client privilege is
designed to protect the client, and to allow the attorney to assert the privilege
to protect his own interest fails to achieve this purpose. Neither the adminis-
tration of justice nor the promotion of open consultation could in any way
be served by applying the privilege to conceal an attorney's fraud.
40
In the second situation, for purposes of identification an attorney is asked
whether or not the defendant is the person he represented in an earlier
proceeding. 41 Technically, in these cases it is the fact of representation which
is at issue rather than the identity of the client. The fact of the attorney's
representation at the earlier proceeding could be easily determined from the
record of that proceeding; therefore, a claim that the fact of representation
was a confidential communication seems particularly inappropriate. Little
but delay would attend privileging the fact of representation.
The third factual variation can be illustrated by Behrens v. Hironimus.
42
cation considered confidential where the matter is to be related to the public or revealed
to a third party. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949). See generally
8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2311 (3d ed. 1940); McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 95 (1954).
36 See, e.g., Mauch v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1940); State v. Toscano,
13 N.J. 418, 100 A.2d 170 (1953); cf., In re ilidge, 162 Ore. 393, 91 P.2d 1100 (1939) (resi-
dence of client not privileged).
37 See, e.g., Rand v. Ladd, 238 Iowa 380, 26 N.W.2d 107 (1947); State v. Fisher, 126
W.Va. 117, 27 S.E.2d 581 (1943); State v. Powell, 161 Wash. 514, 297 Pac. 160 (1931).
38 See, e.g., Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1948); Tomlinson v. United
States, 93 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Kaufman v. United States, 212 Fed. 613 (2d Cir. 1914).
39 113 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1940).
40 An additional justification for the Mauch case may be premised on an implied waiver
theory. The court stated that "The record discloses no offer by the petitioner [the attorney]
to obtain the permissible waiver from his anonymous clients. The absence of such offer
may very well dispense with any necessity for a present determination of where the scale
should come down. If we assume, however, a refusal to waive.... ." Id. at 556. The fact
that the revelation of the client's identity would probably not tend to harm the client is
an additional circumstance which would lend credence to an implied waiver theory.
41 Cases cited note 37 supra.
42 170 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1948).
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In Behrens the privilege was asserted so that a client's testimony, that she
had not had an attorney during the course of her trial, could not be contro-
verted. An attorney's testimony that she had represented the defendant was
admitted by the court, and the attorney-client privilege was held inapplicable.
The client by denying the fact of representation opened the door to the ad-
mission of any evidence that might prove the fact of representation at the
earlier trial. "He cannot blow hot and cold at the same time."4 3 Sustaining
the privilege under these circumstances to prevent normal cross examination
would encourage deception and defeat the purpose of cross examination.
II
Where the courts have determined that the client had reason to believe
that his name would be confidential, the courts have been reluctant to exclude
the client's identity from the privilege.44 When the facts have warranted the
application of the privilege, courts have disregarded the overgenerality of the
majority rule. Where the revelation of the cleint's identity would have the
collateral effect of revealing the previous connections, conduct, or transactions
of the client, the privilege has been generally sustained.45
The unifying factor in cases which have permitted nondisclosure of the
client's identity appears to be judicial concern that the client would be preju-
diced in some substantial way if his identity were revealed. Three recent
cases point up this "prejudice" factor. In Baird v. Koerner,4 6 an attorney
mailed a check to the Internal Revenue Service as payment for delinquent
taxes without revealing the identity of the delinquent taxpayer. (He sug-
gested that the money be deposited in the account for unidentified collections.)
43 Kaufman v. United States, 212 Fed. 613, 618 (2d Cir. 1914).
44 See, e.g., In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d 660, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1960);
Elliott v. United States, 32 Wash. L. Rep. 293 (1904), where the court applied the privilege
to protect a testator's identity, since "it is essentially a confidential and privileged communi-
cation... and few attorneys would be employed to draft wills ff it were understood that
they were at liberty to disclose the fact to any person, or upon any occasion, when disclosure
might be desired." Id. at 297.
45 See. e.g., Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280 (1826). Chirac upheld the at-
torney-client privilege where disclosing the identity would reveal not only the fact of
employment but the reason for the employment. See Annot. 1916 L.R.A. 602; 58 AM.
Jup. Witnesses § 507 (1948).
46 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960), 13 ALA. L. REV. 196 (1960), 47 VA. L. REv. 126 (1961).
The bizarre factual situation presented by Baird v. Koerner is complicated by the fact
that Baird actually claimed the privilege on behalf of a communication made to him by the
attorneys and accountants of the unidentified taxpayers. Allegedly the actual names of
the taxpayers were never revealed to him, but the court disregarded his lack of knowledge
of the ultimate client's identity and decided the case as if Baird were claiming the privilege
on behalf of the taxpayers. The court treats the accountants and attorneys as agents of
the taxpayers and, as such, any communications by them to Mr. Baird, which were set
in motion by the taxpayers, came within the privilege. City & County of S.F. v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal.2d 227, 236-37, 231 P.2d 26, 31 (1951); See 8 WIOMOm, EVIDENCE § 2317
(3d ed. 1940).
The money payment was presumably motivated by a desire to place the un-
disclosed taxpayers in a better position in the event criminal charges were
brought against them by the Internal Revenue Service. Under these circum-
stances the court held that the name of the client was privileged, since the
name was material only as an acknowledgement of the client's guilt. Baird
represents surprising subordination of the interests of the Internal Revenue
Service. 47 The taxpayers would have been subject to possible imposition of
a criminal penalty for willful evasion of income tax or willful failure to pay
a tax.48 By its implied approval of the gambit employed, the court may
well have hampered severely the Internal Revenue Service in its efforts to
deter potential tax evaders. The policy of promoting freedom of consultation
may have been upheld by applying the privilege; but it is doubtful that this
policy was strong enough to outweigh the substantial interests of the Internal
Revenue Service which should have been placed on the other side of the scale.
In another recent case, Ex parte Enzor,49 the Alabama Supreme Court
prevented a grand jury from requiring an attorney to reveal his client's identity
under incriminating circumstances. In Enzor the attorney was asked "to give
... the name of the election official ... in the last Democratic Primary who
told you that he had been offered a sum of money ($100.00) to miscount
or tamper with the election returns." 50 The court stated that "if the client
had already accepted the bribe, he had violated the law and the authorities
seem to be uniform that, in such a case, the identity of the client would be
privileged."S1 The promotion of freedom of consultation and the social
undesirability of obtaining from an attorney incriminating evidence against
his client were substantial enough to outweigh the interests of the grand
jury in investigating election frauds. The communication, if in fact the client
had accepted the bribe, clearly came within the policy and the technical rules
of the attorney-client privilege; and for the court to avoid applying the
privilege would have been a denial of the very existence of the privilege.
47 The present tendency of the courts has been to subordinate the policies behind various
exclusionary rules of evidence to the interests of the Internal Revenue Service. See In re
Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hospital, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953); Falsone v. United
States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953). In a recent case an
attorney appeared before an agent of the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to a summons
directing him to bring the records of a certain company. Other than to state his name and
occupation he refused to answer all questions on the basis of the attorney-client privilege.
The court in flatly disapproving of this practice stated that: "There is no such all-embracing
principle, or talismanic formula, as sought to be advanced by respondent [the attorney]....
The fact of representation is not within the privilege." Gretsky v. Miller, 160 F. Supp.
914, 915 (D.Mass. 1960).
4r INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7201-02.
49 70 Ala. 254, 117 So. 2d 361 (1960).
-1o Id. at 256, 117 So. 2d at 362.
S1 Id. at 260, 117 So. 2d at 365,
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Both the Enzor and Baird cases were based on Ex parte McDonough52
where a grand jury sought disclosure of the identity of a certain client who
had retained an attorney to defend the parties under investigation. In Mc-
Donough the court sustained the privilege in order to protect the client's
identity because, under the circumstances of the case, its revelation was ma-
terial "only for the purpose of showing an acknowledgement of guilt on the
part of such client of the very offenses on account of which the attorney
had been employed to defend him."53
The third of the recent cases which appears to be controlled by a "sub-
stantial prejudice" factor is In re Kaplan.5 4 In Kaplan the attorney had been
employed to pass certain information to a waterfront investigating committee
without revealing the client's identity because of fear of outside reprisals.
The court in Kaplan wisely sustained the privilege as to the client's identity
and stated that: "Usually, it is not the client's name but the client's com-
munication to his lawyer which is held to be sacred, and so, ordinarily, there
is no need to conceal the name to preserve the confidence. But here the
client's communication had already been divulged... and it was the client's
name that deserved and needed protection for fear of reprisals.... ."55 Not
only did the court promote freedom'of consultation by privileging the client's
identity, but, in addition, its decision promoted the interests of the investigat-
ing committee which was seeking information about illegal waterfront activi-
ties. Information may be more readily available to the committee, since po-
tential informants will have less reason to fear reprisals. In re Kaplan was
supported by two previous New York cases which sustained the privilege
where the client's identity would show his connection to an allegedly illegal
sale of property, 56 and where the client's identity would show his allegedly
negligent participation in an automobile accident. 57
In all three of these recent cases it seems clear that the client's identity
under the circumstances, was in fact a confidential communication. The cases
52 170 Cal, 230, 149 Pac. 566 (1915), noted favorably in 29 HARv. L. REv. 109 (1915)
3 CALIF. L. REV. 497 (1915). Compare 3 VA. L. REV. 82 (1915). English cases, although fol-
lowing the same majority rule as the United States, Bursill v. Tanner, 16 Q.B.D. 1 (1885);
Levy v. Pope, M & M 410, 31 Rev. R. 743 (1829), recognize an exception similar to
McDonough where the client would be prejudiced by the attorney's revealing of his name.
Jones v. Pugh, 12 Sim. 470, 41 Eng. Rep. 567 (Ch. 1842); Foote v. Hayne, 1 C. & P. 545,
28 Rev. R. 788 (1824).
53 170 Cal. at 237, 149 Pac. at 568.
54 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d 660, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1960).
55 8 N.Y.2d at 218, 168 N.E.2d at 661, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
56 In re Shawmut Mining Co., 94 App. Div. 156, 87 N.Y.Supp. 1059 (1904). Compare
Carnes v. Platt, 136 N.Y. Super. Ct. 361 (1873); Williams v. Fitch, 18 N.Y. 546 (1859).
57 Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp., 139 Misc. 699, 249 N.Y.Supp 631 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
The court distinguishes the majority cases on the basis that the client in the case before
it was not seeking the use of the courts, but rather that someone was seeking to bring an
action against him,
collectively represent a shift in judicial attitude towards protecting the client's
identity when under the same circumstances other communications to an
attorney would be protected.
In order to decide in the particular case whether or not the claim of privilege
should be allowed, the policies underlying the two lines of cases must be
considered. Primarily, the problem is one of balancing interests.58 The
classical balance that has resulted in the attorney-client privilege has been
the weighing of the policy of promoting freedom of consultation against
the policy of full disclosure of the truth. The balance, however, is not immu-
tably weighted, and at the periphery of the privilege specific interests are
normally placed on the scale. For example, in Baird v. Koerner59 the legitimate
interests of the Internal Revenue Service in seeking to punish a tax evader 60
were subordinated to the interest of the individual litigant in avoiding preju-
dice. Certainly in situations such as In re Kaplan, where both the interest
of the client and the interests of the investigating committee can be promoted,
the scale becomes overweighted in favor of applying the privilege.
The cases where the majority rule has been upheld supposedly have struck
the balance in favor of the "overriding" judicial policy of full disclosure of
the truth. 61 They have subordinated "the slight, though real objection of one
actual client [to]... that body of prospective clients, the public." 62 More re-
alistically the courts which have denied the privilege appear to be impressed
with a certain degree of sharp practice which seems to underlie many of the
attempts to suppress the proof of professional employment. 63 Nevertheless,
under certain circumstances, such as those presented in the Kaplan and Enzor
cases, apprehension about sharp practice should not prevent the courts from
58 For a detailed analysis of this approach see Mauch v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 555,
556 (3d Cir. 1940).
59 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
60 The factual situation of Baird was probably affected by the Internal Revenue Service's
shifting of emphasis from tax collection to deterrence. Consequently, in the past ten
years criminal indictments have been filed in a much greater percentage of cases. The prob-
lem posed to attorneys is that in many instances the taxpayer's attorney has become,
through cooperation with the Internal Revenue Service, an active contributor to the tax-
payer's prosecution. For a partial discussion of this problem see Sokol, Cause for Alarm,
Cm. BAR REc. 63, (1956); Lipton, Privileged Communications, N.Y.U. 13TH ANNUAL
INsTrTTE oN FEDERAL TAXATION 955 (1955).
61 Where newspaper reporters have sought to conceal the identity of their sources, the
policy of full disclosure has also generally prevailed. E.g., People ex rel Mooney v. Sheriff,
269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936). In many instances the reporter will go to jail rather than
reveal the identity of his source, so that the unknown source will continue to give him
information. As a result, many states have by statute privileged the right of a newspaper
reporter to withhold his source of information. For a collection of the statutes, see 8 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 n.13 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1951 and 1957).
62 Mauch v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 555, 556 (1940).
63 See McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVrDENCE § 94 (1954).
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protecting an individual client's identity. In these situations, in which a sub-
stantial prejudice factor is involved, the courts should promote freedom of
consultation by protecting the client's identity in the same manner as they
protect any other confidential communication to an attorney.
MEDICAL DEDUCTION: TEST AND APPLICATION
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides relief for taxpayers who have
incurred substantial medical costs during the tax year.' Section 2132 allows
a limited 3 deduction of "the expenses.., for medical care of the taxpayer,
his spouse, or a dependent. . . .- 4 Although the original purpose of the al-
lowance was not clearly explained,5 the medical deduction is now generally
recognized as an additional element of "ability to pay" considerations in the
federal income tax system.6
The expenses of medical care, as defined by the Code, are the amounts
paid "for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease,
or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body (including
amounts paid for accident or health insurance), or... for transportation
primarily for and essential to... [the enumerated functions]." 7 The courts
have encountered several recurring problems in applying this definition
of medical expense. It was not made clear, for example, whether expense
I By providing tax reductions to those who have incurred medical costs, Congress inflicts
a greater burden upon other taxpayers. Thus, to a degree, the costs of illness are diffused
throughout the society. For analyses of the economic effects of this form of "socializing"
medical care, see KAiHN, PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 126-61
(1960); Jensen, Medical Expenditures and Medical Deduction Plans, LX J. POL. ECON.
503-24 (1952).
2 A medical deduction was originally provided in 1942 as an amendment to the 1939
Code. Revenue Act of 1942, § 127, 56 Stat. 825. The definition of allowable deductions
was substantially maintained in the 1954 Code.
3 Section 213(a) stipulates that only medical costs in excess of 3% of adjusted gross
income are deductible. Sections 213(c) and 213(g) establish maximum amounts per person.
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 213(a). A deduction is not the sole means of providing tax
relief for medical expenses. For a discussion of alternative proposals, see Jensen, Rationale
of the Medical Expense Deduction, 7 NAT'L TAX J. 274 (1954).
5 There is, for example, evidence that the deduction was to be a temporary, wartime
relief measure. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1942): "This allowance is recom-
mended in consideration of the heavy tax burden that must be borne by individuals during
the existing emergency and of the desirability of maintaining the present high level of public
health and morale."
6 See Note, Medical Deduction: Scope and Purpose, 28 IND. L. J. 264 (1953). Judge
Frank viewed the provision as an unparalleled display of legislative charity. Dissenting
in Ochs v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 692, 695 (2d Cir. 1952), he observed that, in allowing
a deduction for medical costs, "for once, Congress, although seeking revenue, shows it
has a heart .... "
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213(e).
